











Evidentialism is the view that one’s belief is justified just in case it fits with the evidence one possesses. I think evidentialism is false, and I think perceptual justification offers a pretty convincing argument for this: perceptual justification isn’t evidential at all. I’ve argued this elsewhere (Lyons 2008, 2009), in part by invoking a dilemma reminiscent of one made famous by Wilfrid Sellars. Here I want to approach a similar conclusion from a different angle. I admit that there is something intuitively appealing about the idea that nondoxastic experience can be evidence for perceptual and other beliefs. But much or all of the intuitive appeal of this idea results from running together two importantly different understandings of evidence, only one of which supports the evidentialist claim. On the straightforward versions of evidentialism, experiences in the relevant sense cannot count as evidence in the relevant sense. There is another possible form of evidentialism that does allow experiences to count as evidence, but it is only an unusual kind of experience, not the familiar sensory experiences that figure into the intuitively appealing idea just mentioned.
	In section 1, I distinguish three notions of evidence; in section 2, I argue that only one of them is what the evidentialist can have in mind by claiming that justification is determined by one’s evidence. In section 3, I offer a brief general taxonomy of evidentialist theories and explain why I’ll be focusing on forms of evidentialism that take experiences to be evidence. In section 4, I return to the Sellarsian dilemma, only this time, it’s what I take to be the actual historical argument, rather than the more familiar and contemporary one. The primary concern of the historical argument was introspection and the justification of introspective beliefs about experiences. I think that this argument shows that an evidentialist theory of introspection cannot be right and that consequently, one kind of evidentialist theory of perception, according to which perceptual justification depends on beliefs about experiences, cannot be right either. In section 5, I argue that this result generalizes to straightforward evidentialist theories that don’t link perception and introspection so closely. The arguments of sections 4 and 5 will not show that every possible version of evidentialism is mistaken, but they will raise problems for the common and familiar versions. In any case, I will be naming names as I go, so it will be clear which versions of evidentialism I think are in trouble. In section 6 I turn to externalist theories to see if they can solve some of the problems for the internalist theories already examined. In section 7, I consider a different internalist form of evidentialism, seemings internalism, and although it might avoid the objections already considered, it does so only by abandoning the conception of experiences that renders evidentialism intuitively attractive. In section 8 I discuss the remaining alternatives for what kinds of epistemic role(s) experiences might play, if not an evidential one. I close in section 9 with some brief concluding comments.

1.	Three senses of ‘evidence’

As others have noticed, the term ‘evidence’ is ambiguous. I want to distinguish three importantly different (though perhaps not exhaustive) senses.​[1]​ 

Factual evidence (F-evidence): We often think and speak of evidence as consisting of mind-independent facts, or states of affairs. We say that the police are searching the crime scene for evidence, or that the Antarctic ice strata contain evidence of global warming, and so on. The way I am understanding this, F-evidence consists of concrete states of affairs: objects and properties and relations of and among them. They are mind-independent and description-independent. Facts, as I here intend the term, are not true propositions, but rather are the states of the world that make the relevant propositions true. Facts are to be individuated in roughly the way that Davidson individuates events, as concrete particulars that might fall under more than one description. So the fact that Venus exhibits phases, for instance, might be the same fact as the fact that the second planet exhibits phases.
	‘Evidence’ in this sense is perhaps a normative term, but it is only normative in a fairly abstract and disembodied sense. To say that e is evidence for h is not to say that anyone is prima facie justified in believing h; it is not even to say that anyone who believes e has any justification for believing h, for one might fail to appreciate e’s evidential significance regarding h. However, e’s being F-evidence for h does imply that someone could become justified in believing h on the basis of e. It implies that e is the sort of thing that could justify one in believing h, even if only when supplemented with the right, true, background beliefs.
	As epistemologists have often noted, nonphilosophers frequently take evidence to be the sort of thing that could be tampered with or placed in a bag and transported (Kelly 2006). We do sometimes treat objects, properties, and events---in addition to facts---as evidence. Perhaps this is simply shorthand for talking about F-evidence: it’s not that the bloody gloves per se are evidence; it’s the fact that the bloody gloves were found in the suspect’s trash that is evidence. (This seems to be Williamson’s [2000] view.) If not, mind-independent objects and the like at least constitute evidence in a sense closely akin to F-evidence. It is tempting to dismiss our ordinary talk about F-evidence as indicating little or nothing about the true nature of evidence in the epistemologist’s sense of the term, and indeed, the philosophical implications of our ordinary language are far from obvious, especially in the absence of a fairly detailed rationale for taking it as revealing something deep and interesting. Nevertheless, I will allow that F-evidence is a legitimate and coherent species of evidence; I think the concept picks out something real in the world. F-evidence may be simply a matter of reliable indication, or it may be more complicated than that; and nothing hangs on it for the present purposes either way. What matters is that F-evidence is objective and mind-independent. Its connection to justified belief will be examined in section 2.

Psychological evidence (P-evidence): We often ask people what their evidence is for some belief. When we do, we are asking what that belief is based on. Evidence, in this sense, need not be good evidence. When it’s not, we sometimes say that it’s not evidence at all, but this is to shift from the nonnormative notion of P-evidence to a closely related but importantly distinct, normative notion (to be addressed next). The term ‘good evidence,’ in the sense of P-evidence, is not redundant, although in the normative sense it is redundant. To say that one’s P-evidence is good evidence is to say that the thing they are basing a belief on is the right sort of thing to base that belief on. 
	I call this psychological evidence because it is defined in terms of a psychological relation: the basing relation. Basing is usually viewed as a kind of causal relation, one that, though quite familiar to epistemologists, is hard to spell out in detail (see Korcz 1997, 2010). What makes the basing relation a psychological relation is that it is a nonnormative relation, where at least one of the relata is a psychological state. More specifically, that which is based on P-evidence is a belief, and that belief is a psychological state. Is the P-evidence itself a psychological state? We’ll come back to this difficult question shortly.

Justifying evidence (J-evidence): When a belief is justified in virtue of being appropriately based on some appropriate P-evidence, that P-evidence is, or provides, J-evidence for that belief.​[2]​ J-evidence is a normative notion. Whereas F-evidence involved a two-place relation between a fact and a proposition, J-evidence involves a three-place relation among the evidence, the belief to be justified, and a subject for whom that belief is justified. What justifies me in believing p might not justify you in believing p. Some epistemologists (e.g., Pollock and Cruz 1999, Conee and Feldman 2004) endorse “evidence essentialism,” the view that if e is evidence of h for S, then necessarily, and for any S, e is evidence of h. But even if this is true, the reference to the subject/cognizer here serves as a useful reminder that J-evidence is a much more subjective affair than F-evidence. If e entails h, then e is F-evidence for h, but it may or may not be J-evidence for me. Presumably, I can’t just believe any random necessary truth on the basis of any random proposition and have the former be thereby justified.
	J-evidence is what we are normally talking about when we talk about someone having (as opposed to there simply being) evidence for something. J-evidence is the sense of ‘evidence’ that evidentialism is concerned with. Although standard formulations of evidentialism define propositional justification without any reference to the agent’s P-evidence, doxastic justification, sometimes called well-foundedness (Feldman and Conee 1985/2004), is usually understood to obtain when a belief is based on something that propositionally justifies it. So if propositional justification is a matter of having evidence, then having evidence must be a matter of being in possession of something that the belief could be (properly) based on. 
	Paraphrasing Pollock (1986, 36) (who prefers the term ‘reason’ to ‘evidence’), I’ll say that 

	e is J-evidence for S that p iff it is possible for S to become justified in believing p on the basis of e.

It is important to stress that ‘on the basis of’ here means ‘by basing it on’; the former phrase is useful in that it doesn’t carry any connotation of deliberate reflection on the part of the cognizer.
	The terms ‘grounds’ and ‘reasons’ are ambiguous in pretty much the same ways that ‘evidence’ is---enough so that I take the three terms to be interchangeable. In particular, when epistemologists talk about grounds and reasons, they are usually talking about P-evidence or J-evidence, sometimes (I think ‘reasons’ is more conducive to this than ‘grounds’) about F-evidence. That is, there is an objective and normative sense (“there are reasons to believe such-and-such”), a purely psychological sense (“what are your grounds for that belief?”), and a subjective and normative sense (“she has [good] reasons to believe him”).
	It is sometimes held that evidence is simply whatever it is that justifies beliefs (Kim 1988, Kelly 2006). I don’t think there is any sense of ‘evidence’ for which this claim is true, but it is clearly not true of any of the three present senses. This matters. If evidence really were just any factor that determined or contributed to the justification of a belief---i.e., if ‘evidence’ just meant ‘justifier’---then evidentialism would be trivially true, for it would say no more than that whether and to what degree a belief is justified is determined entirely by those factors that determine whether and to what degree a belief is justified. But evidentialism is not trivially true. Instead, evidentialism is the contentious claim that the degree of justification of a belief is determined by what that belief is based on. (More precisely, doxastic justification is determined by what the belief is based on; propositional justification is determined by what potential bases are in the agent’s possession.) 




Factual evidence and justifying evidence are conceptually distinct, but this doesn’t say much about the relation between them. Can J-evidence be somehow cashed out in terms of F-evidence? Or vice versa? I’m going to stay neutral about much of this, but some features of the distinction between J-evidence and F-evidence are essential. 
	It is controversial whether all J-evidence is F-evidence. Perhaps my thinking that e entails or probabilifies h is enough to make e J-evidence for me of h---even though e doesn’t objectively entail or probabilify h, i.e., isn’t F-evidence of h. Perhaps, however, this is too subjective: perhaps e must be F-evidence of h in order for e to be J-evidence for S of h. My present purposes don’t require me to take a stand on this. 
	I do, however, need to deny that all F-evidence is J-evidence. Because F-evidence is out there in the world, there is sure to be a great deal of F-evidence that no one does or ever will possess. F-evidence is potential J-evidence, but some of that potential is unactualized. In fact, I think that for the evidentialist, at least, entirely mind-external F-evidence can never constitute J-evidence. The reason for this is that evidentialism holds that it is the possession of evidence, not the mere existence of evidence, that determines justification. Thus, Feldman and Conee’s (1985/2004) seminal statement of evidentialism:

	Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t (83)

This framework principle is neutral on a number of issues, most importantly, whether J-evidential relations (i.e., relations of fit) are necessary (Conee and Feldman 2004, Pollock 1986) or contingent (Alston 1988, Comesaña 2010, Lyons forthcoming a), and what it is to have or possess evidence. But it is possessing evidence that is especially important here. It is true that we sometimes talk as if we base beliefs directly on external facts: “what are you basing that belief on?” “On the fact that the defendant was out of town when the crime was committed.” But in order for someone to base a belief on such facts, she must have some kind of cognizance, or uptake of that fact; the fact must be somehow reflected in her mental state, in her epistemic perspective. In order for e to serve as evidence for S that p, the evidence must be taken in by S, and done so in a way that allows S to in some sense appreciate its evidential significance vis-a-vis p. That is, there is both a possession requirement and an appreciation requirement on evidence. 
	The most straightforward---and sometimes only---way to satisfy both requirements is for the agent to have knowledge or justified belief about the existence of the F-evidence, and a justified belief that it is indeed evidence for some other belief. The fact that the litmus paper turned red is only J-evidence for me that the solution was acidic if I am justified in believing that the paper turned red and also justified in believing that turning red indicates acidity.
	I am claiming that justified belief is sufficient for satisfying the possession and appreciation requirements. I am not claiming that belief is necessary for satisfying either requirement. But if there is a nondoxastic way of “taking in” facts, it will involve that fact making an appearance in, or being reflected in, the agent’s overall mental state. I’m not sure exactly what this means, other than that justifying evidence---as possessed by an agent---is restricted to the mental states of the cognizer, and that for any external fact we might claim to base a belief on, there is some mental state on which the belief is more proximately based, in virtue of which the belief counts as being mediately based on that external fact. If evidence as possessed is restricted to mental states, then J-evidence is restricted to mental states, for it is only evidence one possesses that justifies.
	Here’s a somewhat less contentious way of putting this: if S possesses evidence e and believes h on the basis of e, then there is some mental state m, such that S is in m, S possesses e at least partly in virtue of being in m, and S’s belief that h is based on m. Thus, even if e is something distinct from m, a belief can be based on e only if it is based on m. Even if there is some sense in which beliefs are indirectly based on---and justified in virtue of being based on---extramental facts, this is only ever true in virtue of their being more proximately based on some mental state. Thus we have two basing relations: a “long-armed” one that ranges over extramental facts, and a “short-armed” one that is restricted to mental states. I will understand P-evidence and thus J-evidence in terms of the short-armed relation. This is not just arbitrary terminological fiat; what we are ultimately interested in is justifying evidence that someone possesses and bases beliefs on, and this is determined by the short-armed basing relation. Furthermore, the short-armed relation is the more fundamental of the two, so setting aside the long-armed relation for now allows it to be easily recovered later, from the short-armed relation, if we are interested.
	I say that J-evidence (as possessed) is restricted to one’s mental states. Some evidentialists want to take this further and claim that it is restricted to one’s nonfactive mental states. I am deliberately not taking this additional step. More generally, I am not denying what Silins (2005) calls evidential externalism: the view that  internal duplicates might nevertheless differ with respect to what evidence they possess, due to external differences. One type of evidential externalism (McDowell 1982, Williamson 2000) allows factive mental states to serve as evidence. Thus, seeing that p might have a different evidential import from having a nonveridical visual experience as of p, even if those two states are phenomenally indistinguishable. Similarly, knowing that p might give one evidence that merely justifiedly believing that p does not. This type of evidential externalism claims that two agents, exactly alike in all intrinsic respects, can nevertheless differ with respect to their P-evidence and thus with respect to their J-evidence. The foregoing argument doesn’t dispute this, for it only argues that J-evidence is restricted to mental states, not that it’s restricted to nonfactive mental states.
	A second kind of evidential externalism (Byrne forthcoming) endorses a kind of epistemological disjunctivism without metaphysical disjunctivism. It holds that although the short-armed P-evidence might be the same in the externally different cases, the long-armed P-evidence is different and the J-evidence is therefore different as well. The veridical perceiver’s belief is based (in the long-armed sense) on the fact that there’s a table in front of her, while the hallucinator’s belief is not, and this makes the perceiver’s belief more justified than the hallucinator’s. Although I claimed that the view I articulated two paragraphs back is not merely terminological, I think that the apparent difference between that view and this one is merely terminological. I want to say that (if this kind of externalism is right), both believers base---in an important and legitimate sense of that term---their belief on the same P-evidence, but that the external differences (viz., the long-armed basing) give that P-evidence different J-evidential significance. I think that is just a different way of saying what the second type of evidential externalist is saying.




So there’s an important sense of ‘evidence’ according to which only mental states can serve as evidence. The question now is: which mental states can serve as evidence? A doxastic theory holds that only beliefs (and a restricted set of those) can serve as J-evidence. An experientialist theory holds that nondoxastic experiences can also serve as J-evidence.
	A doxastic foundationalist evidentialism would have to claim that epistemically basic beliefs are literally self-evident, that they serve as their own evidence, and perhaps that they are somehow based on themselves. It is doubtful that anyone foundationalist has ever really held this view, although Williamson (2000) endorses something that resembles it in some ways. More common is for the doxastic evidentialist to endorse coherentism (Sellars 1956, BonJour 1985, Davidson 1986). 
	Although my main concern is with experientialism, I want to point out two problems with doxastic theories. I will start with the less orthodox view. 
	Williamson’s (2000) position can be characterized as the view that facts are evidence (though with facts here understood at true propositions, rather than truthmakers for those propositions), and to possess evidence is to know the relevant fact. Thus, possessed evidence is limited to a certain class of mental states, in fact a certain class of beliefs: knowings, i.e., knowledge. (This is a form of evidential externalism, as discussed in section 2.) His argument for the claim that only knowledge can serve as J-evidence is this: suppose I have seen a very large number of balls drawn from an urn, with replacement, and all of them have been red. Though I haven’t yet seen the last draw, I’m justified in believing (but, intuitively, don’t know) that R: the last draw was red. The following claim seems intuitively to be true: 

	it is consistent with my current evidence that B: the last draw was black.

However, R and B are incompatible, so if my justified belief that R were part of my current evidence, then B wouldn’t be consistent with my current evidence after all. This shows that justified belief isn’t sufficient for evidence, and the best explanation for why R fails to count as evidence is that it isn’t something I know, and that only what I know can be evidence.
	The problem with this argument is that it generalizes in a vicious way. I look at my desk and see---thereby coming to know---that C: there is a cup on my desk. But now I close my eyes, and although I continue to believe C, the following seems intuitively to be true: 

	it is consistent with my current evidence that N: there is not a cup on my desk.

But C and N are incompatible, so C can’t be part of my current evidence after all. Presumably, however, I still know C. But this conflicts with Williamson’s very plausible claim that all knowledge is evidence. He could deny that I know that C, but to do that, it seems, is to deny that nondemonstrative inference could ever yield knowledge, for it seems that we could produce a comparable scenario for any case of nondemonstrative belief. And that is too drastic. It is more plausible to hold that the intuitive claims about consistency with my current evidence are strictly false. It is not true that either B or N is compatible with all of my current evidence, but only with a very large subset of my evidence: roughly, all of my evidence except the parts that straightforwardly entail ~B or ~N, namely, R and C.
	Williamson’s view is a very nonstandard one, not merely because of the restriction of evidence to knowledge, but in the relation between evidence and knowledge. Unless his view is a kind of doxastic coherentism with additional factivity requirements, it is an evidentialism in a trivial sense at most: we have evidence for everything we know, but epistemically basic beliefs aren’t knowledge in virtue of any further evidence. They are trivially self-evident (they entail themselves), but they aren’t knowledge because of evidence; rather, they are evidence because they’re knowledge.
	I have argued that it is too restrictive to claim that only knowledge can provide evidence. But is it still too restrictive to claim that only beliefs can provide evidence? Recall that for the evidentialist, the claim that only beliefs can serve as J-evidence entails that only a difference in beliefs can make a difference to justification. (Without evidentialism, there’s no such entailment.) But a very familiar and crippling problem for doxastic coherentism is that the justification of some beliefs (especially perceptual beliefs) does not seem to be a function of the presence or epistemic status of the rest of the agent’s beliefs. I look out the window and see two birds, and thus become justified in believing so. But there is usually nothing in the rest of my beliefs that makes the belief that there are two birds epistemically preferable to the belief that there is one, or three, or none. And even if there is, perception would typically override it. Perhaps this is too simple; perhaps perception gives us large numbers of interconnected beliefs at a single glimpse (e.g., not just the belief about birds, but also about the colors of the birds, the corresponding perceptual experience, etc.). Even so, there is nothing in the rest of the beliefs that would single out the two-bird belief complex as the appropriate one, as opposed to the other complexes. 
	Something other than beliefs must determine which (perceptual and other) beliefs are justified, and if evidentialism is true, this something else must serve as J-evidence. The best and probably only candidate is some kind of nondoxastic experience.
	Experientialism is the view that nondoxastic experiences can serve as J-evidence for beliefs. Some views have them justify perceptual beliefs directly, others by way of justifying “appearance beliefs”: beliefs about how things appear, or what experiences we’re having. Classical foundationalism takes the latter view, while modest foundationalism takes the former view. Some authors more (Kvanvig 2012, Gupta 2006) or less (Conee and Feldman 2008) explicitly endorse a nondoxastic coherentism, according to which experiences don’t justify anything without the assistance of background beliefs, which thus must get their justification from other beliefs.
	To reiterate: I am defining experientialism as a species of evidentialism, which claims that justification is determined by one’s J-evidence. Experientialism, therefore, is not merely the claim that experiences justify beliefs, but that they do so in a particular way: by serving as J-evidence. If experiences serve only as F-evidence and not J-evidence, then experientialism is false.

4. Classical foundationalism and the Sellarsian dilemma

With all this background in place, I want to dust off an old argument that is supposed to show that experientialism is false. The Sellarsian dilemma was used by Sellars himself in support of coherentism, presumably because he thought that evidentialism is clearly true and that coherentism and experientialism are the only plausible forms of evidentialism. I think that (doxastic) coherentism is obviously false, and so I think that any argument against experientialism is an argument against evidentialism rather than an argument for coherentism. In fact, in earlier work (Lyons 2008, 2009), I used an argument reminiscent of Sellars’s, to argue against evidentialism.
	The argument that I want to explicate and espouse here, however, is different from the one that I and others (e.g., BonJour 1978, 1985) have endorsed. Sellars’s original argument was aimed at a narrow and somewhat unusual target, and perhaps because of this, contemporary discussions of the Sellarsian dilemma tend to follow something more like BonJour’s (1978, 1985, 2003) interpretation and formulation of the argument:

the givenist is caught in a fundamental dilemma: if his intuitions or immediate apprehensions are construed as cognitive, then they will be both capable of giving justification and in need of it themselves; if they are non-cognitive, then they do not need justification but are also apparently incapable of providing it. This, at bottom, is why epistemological givenness is a myth. (BonJour 1978, p. xxx)

 The general idea seems to be something like this:

1.	If experiences lack conceptual/propositional/cognitive​[3]​ content, then they can’t justify beliefs.
2.	If they have conceptual/propositional/cognitive content, then they can justify beliefs, but only if they are themselves already justified.
3.	Either way, therefore, experiences cannot both terminate the justificatory regress and justify beliefs at the same time.

But why believe either of the two premises? A standard argument for the first premise is that without propositional and conceptual content, experiences couldn’t stand in logical or probabilistic relations to beliefs and thus couldn’t justify them (Davidson 1986, McDowell 1994, Williamson 2000). A standard argument for the second premise is that having this kind of content makes these “experiences” really beliefs after all, or at least belief-like enough that they need to be justified in order to confer justification. Of course, none of this is exactly irresistable; many experientialists have found nothing here to worry about. 
	I think that the original argument is in many ways more compelling than this more familiar one, and I think it generalizes in important ways, despite its narrow intended scope.​[4]​ Sellars’s original dilemma is aimed at a classical foundationalist experientialism, in particular, a view that holds that (a) the things receiving justification are appearance beliefs, (b) the things doing the justifying are awarenesses of experiences, and (c) they justify by serving as J-evidence. Sellars couches the discussion in terms of sense-data, so that the appearance beliefs just mentioned are beliefs about sense-data, but (as we will see shortly) the argument doesn’t depend on that assumption. 
	The dilemma then goes like this: ‘awareness of one’s experiences’ is ambiguous. On the one hand, it might refer to a non-truth-evaluable detection of an experience, of the sort that doesn’t require concepts of experience or of the contents of the experience (e.g., doesn’t require the concept red or green, etc.). On this reading, to be aware of experience x is little or nothing more than x’s being a conscious experience. Mice, for instance, are presumably aware of their experiences in this sense of ‘awareness’, although they presumably don’t think of them as experiences. On the other hand, ‘awareness of one’s experiences’ might simply indicate knowing (hence, having justified, true, unGettiered belief) that one is having a certain type of experience, e.g., that one is having an experience as of red. However, the former type of awareness isn’t sufficient for justification of the appearance belief, for one might well have the experience and awareness of it, while having no idea whatsoever what it’s an experience of, that there’s such thing as experience, etc. But the latter type of awareness just is the (justified) appearance belief, so it can’t justify that belief and certainly can’t end the justificatory regress; it’s a justified belief and we still need to know where its justification comes from. So we have two kinds of awareness, a nonpropositional and nonconceptual one and a propositional and conceptual one: a brute awareness of the experience and an awareness that the experience has a certain character. Awareness-of can’t justify belief, and awareness-that can’t terminate the justificatory regress; thus neither can do what these awarenesses are supposed to do for foundationalism: to terminate the regress by providing justification to epistemologically basic beliefs.
	It probably won’t convince everyone, but this version of the argument strikes me as quite a bit more compelling than the more familiar BonJourean one. Taking Sellars’s target as given, it seems that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma is hopeless. If the awareness that is supposed to do the justifying is understood as justified belief, then the theory is no longer the experientialist theory we started with, nor is it at all plausible unless we can somehow understand something literally serving as J-evidence for itself. 
	Concerning the first horn, it is important to remember the two aforementioned requirements for J-evidence: the possession requirement and the appreciation requirement. Awareness-of may suffice for possession of the experience as evidence, but it clearly does not suffice for appreciation of the experience’s evidential relevance. A creature could have a headache without having any idea what a headache is and thus have no justification or J-evidence for the belief that it is having a headache. This doesn’t assume that only metabeliefs could satisfy the appreciation constraint, but it does assume that that constraint is a substantive one and not trivially satisfied. The argument only purports to show that awareness (-of) of the experience is not sufficient for justified introspective belief. Thus, the Sellarsian dilemma is most convincing if its target is a form of evidentialism, for the evidentialist holds that justification is entirely a matter of one’s evidence. 
	The original Sellarsian dilemma, as I’m understanding it, is primarily about introspection, rather than perception. Obviously, not everyone thinks that perceptual justification depends on introspective justification. Classical foundationalists do, however, and one prominent philosopher whose epistemology is directly threatened by the dilemma as I’ve just presented it is, ironically, BonJour.​[5]​ BonJour (2003, 2010) claims that to have a conscious experience is necessarily to have a built in (rather than second-order) awareness. This awareness is nonpropositional and nonconceptual, but I can form a descriptive metabelief about it, e.g., believe that I’m having a visual experience as of a red patch. This second-order belief stands in a descriptive relation to the first-order, built-in, awareness; but the two don’t bear any epistemologically interesting contentful relations to each other; logical and probabilistic relations and the like are only defined (and understood) for propositions or things with propositional contents. Nevertheless, BonJour insists that this is no obstacle to the awareness’ justifying the metabelief, for when I have the nonconceptual awareness of a sensation, I am in “an ideal position to judge directly whether the conceptual description [of it] is accurate” (73); the built-in awareness provides a “clear and compelling reason for thinking that the [descriptive meta-] belief is true” (71).
	But for the Sellarsian reasons just rehearsed, BonJour shouldn’t think that. I could well have the first-order, built-in awareness without having such concepts as red, visual experience, patch and the like. But then it follows that I could have the sensation without having any idea whatsoever whether the descriptive metabelief is accurate, without having any reason at all for thinking the metabelief is true. Awareness-of doesn’t suffice for awareness-that. Awareness-of only gets the sensation into the cognitive system in such a way that the possession requirement is met; it doesn’t go any way toward satisfying the appreciation requirement.
	One could perhaps endorse a view somewhat like BonJour’s except with the work being done on the other end: it’s not so much that the experience of redness automatically carries so much epistemological force; rather, it’s that anything with the concepts of red, visual experience, patch and the like automatically has certain recognitional capacities. According to the epistemological theory of concepts (Pollock 1986), to have the concept red is to have procedural knowledge of what red things look like, that is, to be able to distinguish and recognize the kind of visual experience that indicates redness. I’m not sure that this knowledge can be understood in terms of something other than justified belief, or in terms of something other than reliable indication, in order to make it all usable for the internalist. But suppose it can. If so, then the appreciation requirement would be satisfied---again, not because there’s anything epistemically special about sensations, but because there’s something epistemically special about the concepts employed in the detection of these sensations. 
	But this won’t go far enough to get awareness-that out of awareness-of. It would only secure the justification of those introspective beliefs whose contents are concepts whose possession conditions require the sort of introspective recognitional capacities just mentioned---a very special and small (perhaps empty) set of concepts. It is possible that red is such a concept (though see Fodor 1998), but surely visual experience and cat aren’t. I have concepts for various kinds of perceptual experience that I wouldn’t necessarily be able to recognize if I were to have them: heat “vision,” electeroception, echolocation, etc. And clearly, I could have a concept of cats without knowing the difference between a cat-like visual experience and a cat-unlike one.​[6]​
	Therefore, awareness-of is not sufficient for awareness-that; simply having a conscious experience, one that I’m aware of, does not give me evidence that I’m having an experience, let alone that I’m having a certain type of experience. 
	It might be tempting at this point to embrace a nondoxastic coherentism, holding that experiences don’t justify beliefs alone, but only with the assistance of beliefs about what experiences of various sorts are like. This will strike many as too intellectualist, but the real problem with it is that one would still need a way of knowing what the current experience is like, in order to bring the background knowledge to bear on the classification. The agent would still need an awareness that she is undergoing something with F, for example, in order to make use of the information that F indicates a visual experience as of something red. Awareness of F without awareness that it is F won’t render this background knowledge relevant.
	Note that if the Sellarsian argument works, it works in virtue of the two very different senses of ‘awareness’; the argument doesn’t have anything to do with the object of awareness. In particular, it doesn’t matter whether or not the experiences being introspected have conceptual and/or propositional content. It is easy to slide directly from thinking about propositional/conceptual vs. nonpropositional/nonconceptual modes of awareness to thinking about propositional/conceptual vs. nonpropositional/nonconceptual contents of experience. In fact, the standard contemporary versions of the Sellarsian dilemma replace the former with the latter without seeming to notice the swap. But it doesn’t matter for the present purposes whether experiences have content, conceptual or propositional or otherwise. Even if the target state does have conceptual and propositional content, one could be introspectively aware of the state without having any idea (i.e., any justified belief about) what type of state it is. 
	I’m not sure it’s true that awareness-of requires awareness-that, but suppose it is; suppose that for S to be aware of x there must be some feature F of x, such that S is aware that x has F. Even if this is true, it wouldn’t follow that S couldn’t be aware of the target state without knowing its conceptual content, unless that conceptual content were the only introspectively detectable property that state had. But if that were the case, then the state in question would hardly count as an experience, for surely whatever experiences are, they have introspectable properties in addition to their contents.​[7]​ I might be aware, for example, that my current visual experience is vivid, or annoying, or just started, without knowing that it’s an experience as of something red.
	Finally, Sellarsian worries aside, the current attention to introspection and evidentialism raises very difficult questions about “introspective evidence.” It is far from obvious that there is such a thing. The epistemically best cases of introspection will occur when the introspective belief is caused by the target mental state, has a content that conforms in some sense to the target, and results from an appreciation of the match between the two. This still wouldn’t indicate that the target mental state is in any sense evidence for the metabelief, because it doesn’t indicate that the metabelief is in any sense based on the target mental state. Imagine that the target were my belief that it’s sleeting outside. My metabelief, that I believe that it’s sleeting outside, isn’t based on my belief that it’s sleeting outside, at least not in the way that my belief that the roads will be hazardous is based on that belief. As argued above, my J-evidence for some belief is limited to what that belief is based on; so if my introspective belief receives evidence from the experience, then it must be based on that experience. But the relation between an introspective belief and the experience that makes it true doesn’t seem to be a relation of basing after all; it seems to be some quite different relation. The basing relation is in some way akin to inference, but the introspection relation is something much more like perception. One might claim that I’m being too restrictive about what counts as basing. However, there is a clear difference between what’s going on in the introspective case and what’s going on in the traditional basing case. If the experientialist wants to claim that introspection involves some new, unusual kind of basing relation, in addition to the old familiar kind, then some further argument and explanation will be necessary.
	
5. Generalizing the Sellarsian argument

Again, Sellars is arguing against a view that holds (a) the things receiving justification are appearance beliefs, (b) the things doing the justifying are awarenesses of experiences, and (c) they justify by serving as J-evidence. A more common form of experientialism is a modest foundationalist one, which rejects (a) and (b), claiming instead that (a′) the things receiving justification are beliefs about external objects and/or their properties, (b′) the things doing the justifying are the experiences themselves, rather than awarenesses of them, and (unaltered) (c) they justify by serving as J-evidence.​[8]​ 
	There are reasons to prefer a modest foundationalist version of evidentialism over a classical foundationalist one, but I don’t think that the modest foundationalist view fares any better concerning the current problems. 
	Consider first (a) vs. (a′): the belief receiving justification. The crucial difference between modest foundationalism and classical foundationalism is that the latter, but not the former, holds that the justification of perceptual beliefs depends on the justification of introspective beliefs. My Sellarsian argument concerns introspection, not perception more generally, so it doesn’t pose a direct problem for the modest foundationalist theory of perception. Even if not, the modest foundationalist will need a theory of introspection as well, and that account will be quite similar to the classical foundationalist’s account. The conclusion of the previous section was that experiences themselves can’t serve as J-evidence for beliefs about those experiences. If this is right, then experientialism (an evidentialist view that holds that experiences can serve as J-evidence) simply doesn’t have a theory of introspection. This is equally a problem for modest foundationalist, classical foundationalist, and nondoxastic coherentist versions of experientialism. If introspection ever does result in justified beliefs, then all these experientialist theories are false. Because introspection obviously does sometimes result in justified belief, I take this to be a serious problem for experientialism.
	Let me pause to make this more explicit: if the Sellarsian dilemma refutes classical foundationalism, then it refutes evidentialism. The problem with classical foundationalism isn’t specific to its theory of perception; rather it’s the theory of introspection that causes the trouble. But that theory of introspection is common to evidentialism in general, not just in its classical foundationalist incarnations.
	Nevertheless, I think the problem generalizes to the modest foundationalist’s theory of perception as well. One reason to prefer (b′) over (b) is that we don’t seem to need to reflect on our perceptual experiences in order to have justified perceptual beliefs, and the reference to awareness in (b) seems to hint at a classical foundationalist theory of perception. Clearly the modest foundationalist doesn’t want to require us to have beliefs about our experiences in order for those experiences to confer justification, but is this the same as denying that awareness of these experiences is needed, in order for them to confer justification? Could experiences of which I’m unaware confer justification? This doesn’t seem plausible.​[9]​ It is at the very least, not an option for the access internalist. Access internalism imposes an awareness constraint on justification, in such a way that the Sellarsian argument can be run in a form much like its original. E is some perceptual experience that is supposed to justify my perceptual belief about the world outside me. But E can only justify this belief in the internalist manner if I’m aware of E. This awareness can be either awareness-of, in which case it doesn’t confer justification after all; or it can be awareness-that, in which case it doesn’t terminate the regress, because it is itself a justified belief. It is not exactly the same problem as with the original dilemma, for this time around, the awareness is not the belief that E was supposed to justify (here, the external object belief) but is instead a distinct appearance belief. Still, it is a belief, and so can’t terminate the regress. (In addition, the resulting attempt would be incompatible with modest foundationalism, which claims that appearance beliefs aren’t necessary for perceptual justification.)
	Even if the evidentialist explicitly denies that the agent must be aware of her experiences in order for them to confer justification, a crucial problem remains: I claim to have shown in the previous section that experience-with-awareness is not sufficient to confer J-evidence. A fortiori, the experience alone (with or without awareness) is not sufficient for J-evidence. Does it matter that the previous section took the justificandum belief to be an introspective belief, while we are now concerned with perceptual beliefs? I have been insisting that it is possible to have a visual experience as of something’s being F without being at all justified in believing that one’s experience is as of something’s being F---not only because one might lack the concept of experiences, but because one has no idea what F things look like. In such a case, it seems counterintuitive---at least from an evidentialist perspective---to claim that the agent would still be justified (even prima facie) in believing that something nearby was F. Thus the Sellarsian objections to an evidentialist account of introspection generalize to a modest foundationalist evidentialist theory of perception.
	The view that mental states are self-presenting (i.e., such that anyone who is in state M is thereby prima facie justified in believing she’s in M) has fallen out of favor in recent years, especially among modest foundationalists. And self-presentation seems to fail even for mental states with conceptual and propositional content: I might believe that p without being justified in believing that I believe that p. But then, whether or not perceptual experiences have propositional and conceptual content, having an experience as of something’s being F should be no guarantee that the perceiver has any prima facie justification for believing that something is F.
	None of the argument of the previous section depended on whether the experience/awareness was supposed to justify an introspective or perceptual belief. Shifting the putative evidence to experiences themselves rather than awareness of experience doesn’t solve many of the problems arising from the Sellarsian dilemma, it only obscures them, for it brushes the hard part---the introspective classification of that experience---under the rug.​[10]​ But some kind of introspective classification (maybe doxastic, maybe not) is needed to satisfy the appreciation requirement. Perhaps it is a logical truth that all experiences are conscious and thus there is some kind of awareness necessary for something’s counting as an experience, some kind of built-in awareness, a la BonJour. But as we saw above, that’s not enough to give me any reason to think the sensation I’m now having is one that indicates that something nearby is red, or blue, or bitter, or sweet, or a cat, or a telephone, etc.
	Consider Conee and Feldman: 

	Examples intuitively support that we have experiences as [J-]evidence. Your evidence for the proposition that it is warm where you are typically includes your feeling of warmth, your evidence for the proposition that you are frustrated by being stuck in the heat of a traffic jam typically includes a palpable sense of your own frustration, your evidence for the proposition that the car in front of yours in the traffic jam is red typically includes your visual experience of how the car looks, and so forth. (2008, 87)
	
Our intuition, however, is not as specific as they need it to be. What is intuitive here is that experiences are epistemically relevant, not that they are J-evidence. 
	It is clear that my sensation of warmth is F-evidence for the proposition that it’s warm here, that my feeling of frustration is F-evidence for the proposition that I’m frustrated, and that my visual experience is F-evidence for propositions about the properties of the car. That’s no comfort to evidentialism, however, for evidentialism needs these experiences to be J-evidence.​[11]​ And, as we have seen, there is no quick inference from F-evidence to J-evidence. In order to constitute J-evidence, the F-evidence must be taken in by the subject, and done so in a way that allows her to appreciate the fact’s significance vis-a-vis the proposition to be justified. Even if my merely having a conscious experience guarantees that it has been taken in, it doesn’t guarantee that the appreciation requirement has been met. I might have and be aware of the experience of warmth without having any idea that it’s an experience of warmth, etc.
	I think what makes this point easy to miss is that we describe the experiences by invoking the very same conceptual terms that appear in the beliefs these experiences are supposed to justify. Suppose that the sensation of warmth (in S, at t) is identical with brain state # 67734. Clearly, having a sensation of warmth doesn’t automatically give S J-evidence for the proposition that she’s in brain state # 67734. For the same reason, although perhaps less obviously, being in brain state # 67734 doesn’t automatically give S J-evidence for the proposition that she’s feeling warm. The reason is that simply having access to the F-evidence (feeling warm/being in brain state # 67734) doesn’t suffice for S’s appreciation of any particular evidential relevance. This is true even though in each case, the former is F-evidence for the latter. And the same is true if the target belief is a perceptual belief about the external world, rather than an introspective belief: being in brain state # 67734 doesn’t automatically give S J-evidence for the proposition that it’s warm in her car.
	So what the evidentialist is doing, I claim, is this: noticing that experiences are F-evidence for certain beliefs, then choosing conceptual descriptions of that F-evidence that match the conceptual contents of those beliefs, in such a way that the F-evidence seems intuitively like it must be J-evidence as well. But this is a mistake; it’s our description of the F-evidence that makes its J-evidential status seem inevitable, but the subject could have the experience and be quite aware of it, without having any guess that this is a correct description of it. 
	I have been arguing that this is true even if the experience in question has conceptual content, for the subject could be aware of the experience in virtue of latching on to some other features of the experience besides that conceptual content. Even if a pretty extreme conceptualism about experience is true and experience is fully conceptual (e.g., McDowell 1994), it doesn’t follow that one couldn’t be aware of the experience without being aware of the content of the experience, so long as the experience has other features besides its content, which one could latch onto.
	Again, none of this depends on an assumption that one must have metabeliefs about her evidence in order to appreciate the relevance of that evidence. It depends on the fact that an experience is the sort of thing you could have, and have consciously, without necessarily having any idea what kind of experience it is. 




It is because of this and other sorts of regress that I have carefully refrained from claiming that having a justified metabelief about the evidential relevance of e to h is necessary for appreciating the evidential relevance of e to h, although it is sufficient. To claim that such metabelief is necessary would be to beg the question against certain important forms of evidentialism. This does not mean, of course, that the onus is on me to find some way of making sense of appreciation in nondoxastic terms. Indeed, it is the evidentialist who owes us such an account, and if she can’t provide one, so much the worse for her view.
	Nevertheless, I want to look briefly at a few possible attempts to understand appreciation in terms of something other than justified belief, to see how they fare. This can’t be an exhaustive investigation, but hopefully it will show something about the general kinds of moves an evidentialist would need to make to save the view.
	First, consider a view like Alston’s (1988) “Internalist Externalism.” He claims that a belief needs to be based on evidence (“grounds”) in order to be justified, and that this evidence must be an introspectively accessible mental state of the agent (in order to satisfy the possession requirement). The only other requirement Alston imposes is that the evidence reliably indicate the truth of the belief based on it. This requirement, however, is clearly aimed at explicating evidential fit, rather than appreciation. As such, his view doesn’t impose an appreciation requirement, and it suffers accordingly. Recall the kinds of examples that motivated the appreciation requirement above: I can’t remember which litmus color indicates base and which indicates acid, but I guess and believe that the solution is acidic on the basis of the litmus paper’s turning red. It turns out that red litmus paper objectively really is F-evidence for acidity, and so my belief satisfies Alston’s requirements. But it is not (even prima facie) justified. It seems that what has gone wrong here is that my P-evidence does not constitute J-evidence, because I am not in a position to appreciate its status as F-evidence.
	It’s not hard to come up with perceptual cases of a similar nature. The professional ornithologist has a certain visual experience and justifiedly believes that there’s a pileated woodpecker nearby. The novice has an identical visual experience and, as the result of a lucky guess, forms the same belief. Because the experience does reliably indicate the presence of pileated woodpeckers, the novice satisfies Alston’s requirements, but surely is not justified---again, presumably, because she doesn’t appreciate the evidential significance of the experience.
	There are ways for the externalist to avoid these sorts of counterintuitive consequences. One could require that the perceptual belief be the result of a generally reliable process (Goldman 2011), or that it be the manifestation of a competence (Sosa 2007) or capacity (Schellenberg 2013, forthcoming) or proper functioning (Plantinga 1993, Graham 2012), or that it result from a certain kind of cognitive module (Lyons 2009). Let me grant for the present purposes that any of these views would solve the current problem, of avoiding the sorts of counterintuitive result that we get from indicator reliabilism. The question is whether they do so by offering a nonevidentialist theory or by offering a new, better, less intellectualist understanding of appreciation and of what is needed to satisfy the appreciation requirement.
	My own view (Lyons 2009) is explicitly a nonevidentialist theory. One needn’t have experiences in order to have perceptual justification; all one needs are reliably produced beliefs that result from a perceptual module. On my view, the reliability and the modularity are doing all the epistemological work. Yes, we typically do have perceptual experiences, but even if we didn’t, we would have prima facie justified perceptual beliefs, so long as the modularity and reliability remain.​[13]​ Thus, even if I were to think that as a matter of empirical or even conceptual fact, one simply couldn’t have the reliability and the modularity without having experiences, the resulting view would not be an experientialist view, for it would not be an evidentialist view. Experiences would be necessary, but only as a means to realizing nonevidential epistemic factors like reliability and modularity.
	Similar considerations hold for the other views that improve on indicator reliabilism. Plantinga (1993), for example, holds that perceptual beliefs are justified when they result from proper functioning. He happens to think that we are designed to form perceptual beliefs in response to certain perceptual experiences, so an agent will be functioning properly in forming a perceptual belief only if she has a perceptual experience. Nevertheless, experiences are here only a means to satisfying the proper function requirement, and the view is not in any interesting sense an evidentialist one. Had we been designed differently, experiences would play no role, and the perceptual beliefs would remain justified without being based on any evidence. In fact, it’s not empirically obvious that we really are designed the way Plantinga thinks we’re designed; if it turns out that experiences don’t play a significant role in our design plan, this won’t be a crushing refutation of proper functionalism. The view can take experiences or leave them, unlike, say, BonJour’s view, or Feldman and Conee’s view: these views require something to serve as evidence for the basic beliefs, and if experiences were out of the picture, the rest of the epistemology would quickly collapse.
	Similarly for the other externalist views mentioned above. If justification is a matter of process reliability, or the exercise of capacities or competences, then experiences will be optional in roughly the way they are for proper functionalism. These views do not seem to be experientialist views, even if particular articulations of them are contingently committed to experiences playing an important epistemic role.
	Still, the externalist might offer her theory as a way of understanding appreciation in less intellectualist terms.​[14]​ Take proper functionalism again​[15]​, which could claim that being designed to move from e to h is sufficient for appreciating the evidential relevance of e to h. This seems initially plausible, but I think that what makes it seem plausible is that it seems plausible to hold that if I’m designed to move from e to h, then the move from e to h is justification-conferring (everything else equal). But that’s not yet appreciation of evidence as such. There’s no reason yet to think that e is serving here as evidence for h. 
	Higher order belief formation is a distinct competence and process from perception, and therefore will fall under a logically distinct segment of the overall design plan. Thus, S might be designed to move from a certain perceptual experience to the perceptual belief that there’s a cat in front of her, without being designed to recognize that experience as an experience as of a cat. S’s perceptual belief would be justified, but her metabelief about evidential significance would not be. She might even have a metabelief that’s at odds with the designed perceptual transition, e.g., that that experience indicates the presence of dogs, rather than cats. It seems odd, to me, anyway, to interpret this as S’s appreciating the evidential significance of that experience for the proposition that there’s a cat nearby. We could insist that this kind of case offers an illustration of appreciation without metabelief, but it seems as good or better to see it as an instance of justified perceptual belief without appreciation and thus without evidence. My own theoretical commitments incline me to the latter view---I find it more natural to say of this case that S’s visual system appreciates the evidential significance of the experience than to say that S does---but even if the former view is tenable, it is not obviously superior to mine. Thus, I don’t think that the initial intuitive plausibility of the proper functionalist suggestion I have just offered (of understanding appreciation in design terms) really provides any argument for an externalist account of appreciation. 




I have been postponing discussion of an important option. I have insisted that the original Sellarsian dilemma is different from the dilemma typically discussed in the contemporary literature. The former distinguishes a conceptual from a nonconceptual mode of awareness, while the latter distinguishes conceptual from nonconceptual contents of experience. Most of the responses to the contemporary dilemma involve grasping one of the two horns of the dilemma. For example, “seemings internalism” is the view that

	if it experientially seems to S that p, then S is prima facie justified in believing that p

(Audi 1998, Pollock 1986, Pryor 2000, Huemer 2007, Tucker 2013). There are, on a such a view, different kinds of seemings, corresponding to different kinds of experience: perceptual seemings, mnemonic seemings, perhaps even rational intellectual seemings, etc. These seemings are taken to have propositional and conceptual content, as they must, if their content is to match the content of the beliefs they justify. I have argued that the version of the dilemma I am pressing is unconcerned with whether or not the experience has propositional or conceptual content. So it doesn’t help simply to claim that the relevant experiential states are to be construed as seemings. Even if seemings internalism has an adequate solution to the contemporary dilemma, this doesn’t translate to a solution to the current dilemma.
	However, perhaps the seemings internalist can find a way between the horns of the current dilemma (as opposed to grasping one, as she does with the contemporary dilemma). Here’s the idea: the seemings theorist (or at least one type of seemings theorist) holds that perception typically consists of a nonconceptual element---the sensation; a doxastic element---the perceptual belief; and a third element---the seeming, which has conceptual and propositional content, but which is not a belief (Tucker 2010). In cases of known illusion, for instance, it perceptually seems to be that the one line is longer than the other, even though I don’t believe this to be true. So the seeming is some sui generis propositional attitude type, at least in the sense that it involves a relation to a proposition, and that relation is not reducible to any of the standard propositional attitude types (beliefs, desires, intentions) or combinations thereof.
	This general story could be adapted to introspection as well. In addition to the sensation of the headache, and my belief that I have a headache, it also seems to me that I have a headache. This seeming would be absent were I to have a headache without having any concept of headaches, or if I lacked the relevant recognitional capacities. Additionally, I could be so distrusting of introspection that even though I did have a headache, and it seemed to me that I had a headache, I suspended belief on the matter, or even believed, via testimony or induction, that I didn’t have a headache. Finally, there’s no obvious reason why it couldn’t seem to me that I had a headache even if I didn’t. Thus, the sensation, the seeming, and the belief, are all logically distinct, and we could possibly have any one or two of the three without the others.
	My presentation of the Sellarsian dilemma supposes that there are two modes of introspective awareness: a direct, nonconceptual/nonpropositional awareness-of and a conceptual/propositional awareness-that. Introspective seemings might offer a third possibility: something much like awareness-that, only nonfactive, and---most importantly---nondoxastic. My seeming to have a headache would count as (propositional and conceptual) awareness in roughly the way that my seeming to see a dog counts as (propositional and conceptual) awareness of the dog, but without involving belief and thus without continuing the regress. It’s not a belief, so it doesn’t need to be justified in order to confer justification, but it has conceptual content, so it satisfies the appreciation constraint. 
	Seemings internalism thus appears to offer a viable form of evidentialism, one that might even avoid the current version of the Sellarsian dilemma.​[16]​ There are, however, problems for such a view. The one I want to focus on here is one that parallels an important problem for the seemings internalist theory of perception: if what justifies my belief that I have a headache is my seeming to have a headache, then the headache itself isn’t playing any epistemic role, since I could have the seeming without having the headache itself and still be perfectly justified. Of course, this generalizes. The nonconceptual element in sensory experience is rendered inert by seemings internalism, because all the justificatory work is done by the higher level, conceptual, seemings state. It is not clear that such a view really offers a vindication of experientialism, for the evidentialism is retained only by purging from the class of potential J-evidence everything that genuinely counts as experience. 
	Now obviously in some sense, seeming states are experiential: they have phenomenal character, and they aren’t beliefs. I won’t fight over the term ‘experience’. But it’s worth pointing out how different seemings are from standard, what I will now call “sensory”, experiences. Sensory experiences have a rich phenomenology, they have a modality-specific, and usually spatial character.​[17]​ Seemings, on the other hand, have a phenomenology in the sense that beliefs do: there’s something that it’s like to seem to see a horse, just like there’s something that it’s like to (consciously) believe that there’s a horse. But there isn’t much that it’s like to have either seemings or beliefs. What it’s like to seem to see a horse is very different from what it’s like to see (or hallucinate, etc.) a horse. I grant that there is a phenomenology connected to seemings, just as there is a phenomenology connected to beliefs, but it is a bland and generic phenomenology, in contrast to the rich phenomenology of sensory experiences (Lyons forthcoming b). There is no intrinsic difference between its visually seeming to me that my wife is talking to me and its auditorily seeming to me so, although of course there is a difference between the visual sensation of her talking to me and the auditory sensation. Similarly, there is something that it’s like to seem to have a headache, but that something isn’t unpleasant---at least, no more unpleasant than it is to believe one has a headache. It doesn’t hurt, in the way that a headache does. 
	Seemings internalists don’t often draw attention to this distinction between their seemings and sensory experiences (although Tucker 2010 does), and it’s no surprise, for none of this is very flattering to the view. As the Conee and Feldman quotation above indicates, there is an intuitive epistemic link between experiences and introspective or perceptual beliefs. Seemings internalism doesn’t do justice to these intuitions, and thus shouldn’t derive any plausibility from them, because these aren’t the kinds of experience seemings internalism posits as ultimate evidence. The intuitive examples support the claim that sensory experiences are evidence for beliefs, and seemings internalism does nothing to accommodate that intuition. Seemings internalism sounds like the claim that experiences serve as evidence, but what it really says is that a highly selective and atypical set of nonsensory experiences serve as evidence. As a rough approximation, take all the perceptual and interoceptive experiences of the sort that we might share with a cat.​[18]​ Delete them, for they have no epistemic relevance. The “experiences” that are left over must do all the justificatory work.
	Now I myself am a proponent of “zombie epistemology”: I think, as mentioned above, that creatures without conscious experiences could have justified perceptual beliefs. But not everyone is as fond of zombies as I am. I doubt that many internalists---let alone experientialists!---would be so eager to bar sensory experiences from their epistemology. Such a view is, at the very least, not motivated by the sorts of intuitions Conee and Feldman offer, and it’s not entirely clear what the motivations are, once we really understand what ‘[nonsensory-]experientially seems that p’ means. Seemings internalism is perhaps a form of experientialism, but not one that respects the sorts of intuitions that tend to make experientialism attractive in the first place.
	
8. F-evidence and epistemic relevance

I have been arguing that experiences, at least sensory experiences, cannot serve as J-evidence, and that evidentialism is therefore false. I have not claimed that experiences cannot be F-evidence for perceptual or introspective beliefs; in fact, I think that much of the initial plausibility of evidentialism stems from a tacit recognition of the fact that experiences are F-evidence, along with a failure to consistently distinguish F-evidence and J-evidence. Nor have I denied that sensory experiences have some epistemological role to play in ordinary perception and introspection, though what exactly this role is, is not immediately obvious. 
	The fact that sensory experiences are F-evidence doesn’t have any direct implications for what anyone is actually justified in believing or why. But they are not J-evidence either, or so I have argued. Does it follow that sensory experiences don’t have any epistemic relevance? Since it’s false that evidence just is whatever conduces to justification, experiences might still have a justificatory role to play. Three salient possibilities are worth briefly mentioning.

Metaphysical dependence: one possible epistemic role that experiences might play for a view like BonJour’s is this: despite the objections leveled earlier, it remains true that we are quite good at forming correct introspective beliefs when we are in the “ideal position” of having the object of that belief directly in mind. In these conditions---but only in these conditions---it is easy to get the introspective belief right and hard to get it wrong. This may have too much of a reliabilist element to it to be of any interest to BonJour himself, but it an option worth presenting, and one that reserves a special epistemic (though nonevidential) position for sensory experiences, at least vis-a-vis introspection. Whether this gives experiences any special role to play in perceptual belief depends at least in part on whether perceptual belief involves introspection. Alternatively, perception itself might be more reliable when experiences are involved (Goldman 2011), and so experiences would contribute to reliability and thus to justification without serving as evidence. Or, as discussed above in section 6, experiences might contribute to justification by contributing to proper functioning. There are other, more indirect, ways that perceptual justification might metaphysically depend on sensory experience. For example, sensory experiences might be necessary to give certain introspective beliefs their contents (Chalmers 2003) or to establish referents for demonstrative beliefs about the objective appearances of distal objects (Williamson 2000). Any of these ways would allow sensory experiences to play a crucial epistemic role, although not an epistemic role that would give any special comfort to the evidentialist.

Causal dependence: whatever justifies introspective or perceptual beliefs might causally depend on the occurrence of sensory experiences. Sensory experiences might cause higher level perceptual seemings, for instance, which in turn serve as J-evidence for belief. This view clearly extends the role of sensory experiences to perception as well as introspection, although it is a weaker kind of dependence than metaphysical dependence, and thus a less crucial epistemic role. Even if seemings causally depend on sensory experiences, one doesn’t need to have sensory experiences to enjoy normal perceptual justification. This is because one doesn’t need to have sensory experiences in order to have perceptual seemings. It’s the easiest and most common way, but a neurosurgeon or Cartesian demon could intervene and produce the seeming without the sensory experience, and the agent would be as justified as she would have been in an ordinary case of perception.​[19]​ One might argue that mere causal dependence doesn’t grant a significant epistemic role to sensory experiences after all, that if that’s all there is, then experiences are basically irrelevant. But maybe this judgment will seem premature in contrast to the next alternative.

Accidentality: sensory experiences might be neither of the above, in which case, they really would be irrelevant to the justification of introspective or perceptual beliefs. Process reliabilism (e.g., Goldman 1979) holds that the reliability of the causal process responsible for a belief determines the justificatory status of that belief. If sensory experiences are causally implicated in perceptual belief formation, and in such a way that perceptual beliefs formed in the absence of these experiences would count as being produced by a different process type, then the justification of perceptual beliefs would metaphysically depend on sensory experiences. It is an empirical possibility, however, that sensory experiences play no causal role in ordinary perception.​[20]​ Epistemologists tend to assume that perceptual beliefs causally depend on experiences, but I’m not aware of anyone who cites any evidence for this clearly empirical claim. Anecdotal observation suggests that the two are causally linked, but anecdote and introspection can’t distinguish between the hypothesis that the experiences cause the beliefs and the hypothesis that they are joint effects of a common cause. Of course, it is also an empirical question whether sensory experiences are causally implicated in the production of seemings. If not, then seemings internalism doesn’t reserve any special epistemic role for sensory experiences.
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^1	  Similar distinctions are made by (among others) Conee and Feldman (2008). I’m not sure that what I’m calling ‘factual evidence’ is exactly the same as what they call ‘scientific evidence’, but I won’t try to tease out the differences. Importantly, I am using ‘justifying evidence’ in the same way that they do. 
^2	  I say “is, or provides” because sometimes we think about J-evidence as a relation and sometimes as a relatum. In the latter case, the P-evidence is also J-evidence, although I think the conception of J-evidence as a relation is more fundamental and more helpful. P-evidence is, I think, always understood as a relatum rather than a relation.
^3	  This is not intended to suggest that conceptual, propositional, and cognitive content are all the same; it is intended to cover different versions of the basic argument.
^4	  Although I will be explicating what I think was Sellars’s actual view, found in Part I (especially section 7) of EPM (1956), I won’t try to argue for this interpretation.
^5	  Although he does use the term ‘reason’, it is not entirely clear whether BonJour endorses evidentialism: whether he means for the awareness to be J-evidence for the introspective belief or to justify it in some other manner. Either way, I think the problem for his view is substantial.
^6	  James Genone (in correspondence) suggests that this sort of objection might be avoided if we distinguish between theoretical and perceptual concepts of F. The idea, I think, is that in perceptual judgment we employ a perceptual concept of cat, and in some thoughts about cats, we employ a distinct, theoretical, concept of cat. The fact that I can think about cats without knowing what they look like (or smell like, etc.) therefore doesn’t show that the perceptual cat concept isn’t a recognitional concept. It would take me too far from the present concerns to pursue this line in any detail; for now I leave it as the beginnings of a possible response on behalf of experientialism.
^7	  This is true even if these properties are had in virtue of those contents, i.e., even if representationalism is true.
^8	  My concern here is not with modest foundationalism in general (which I take to be the view that all justified beliefs are or derive their justification from basic beliefs and that some of these basic beliefs are beliefs about external objects, rather than just our own experiences), but with an experientialist version of the view. Reliabilists, for example, are often modest foundationalists without being experientialists.
^9	  It is not obvious that this is a coherent possibility. Surely there are perceptual states of which I’m unaware, but perhaps they only count as experiences if I’m aware of them. I’m not committed to the claim that there are experiences of which the agent is unaware; I’m committed to the claim that experiences of which the agent is unaware don’t provide J-evidence. I’m happy if this turns out to be vacuously true.
^10	  It does solve one problem: modest foundationalism, unlike classical foundationalism, does not require perceivers to have the concept of experience to have justified perceptual beliefs. But the main problem remains, the problem of knowing what the experience is of.
^11	  This is patently true of Feldman and Conee’s evidentialism, for they explicitly formulate evidentialism in terms of J-evidence (Conee and Feldman 2008), but as I argued in section 2 above, I think this applies to evidentialism in general.
^12	  This is true despite the fact that the requirement does not explicitly figure into their view, which holds that justification is entirely determined by how well the belief fits with the evidence one possesses. They must mean to build that requirement implicity into either the possession requirement or, more likely, their understanding of evidential fit. Fit, for Feldman and Conee, is a subjective matter, dependent in part on the subject’s appreciation of the objective relations.
^13	  The ‘prima facie’ qualification is necessary, because most of us know enough that if we found ourselves having perceptual beliefs without perceptual experiences, we would be right to think something was wrong; we would thus have potential defeaters for those perceptual beliefs.
^14	  This was suggested by Mary Salvaggio (in conversation).
^15	  The same general points will apply to process, competence, and capacity views. 
^16	  I say ‘might’ because I’m not at all convinced that seemings thus construed are not token-identical to beliefs after all (Lyons 2009). The standard argument only shows that they’re not type-identical. If the seeming isn’t distinct from the belief, of course, the view doesn’t offer a third alternative after all.
^17	  I think that all perceptual sensory experiences have a spatial character and some interoceptive sensory experiences do as well (e.g., pain, hunger). Others, like moods and emotions, might not. Hence the ‘usually’ hedge.
^18	  I say it’s a rough approximation, because cats surely have concepts, and probably some of these concepts are commensurate with our own. To the extent that conceptual overlap is rare, the approximation here is a good one; if none of their concepts were the same as any of ours, the thought experiment wouldn’t involve approximation: any state we could share with them would be nonconceptual.
^19	  I am supposing that an “ordinary” case of perception is, as modest foundationalism would have it, one that does not involve introspection. Because even on this view the justification of introspective beliefs might metaphysically depend on experiences, perception that involved introspection as well might have a different epistemic status if the sensory experiences were to be absent.
^20	  Related worries arise for introspection, but to render them at all pressing would require spelling out detailed theories of introspection, which I can’t do here.
^21	  Thanks to Peter Baumann, Alex Byrne, Philippe Chuard, Juan Comesaña, Kevin Connolly, Justin Fisher, James Genone, Dan Greco, Robert Howell, Michael Huemer, Alex Jackson, Peter Klein, Matthew Lockard, Adrienne Prettyman, Mary Salvaggio, Susanna Schellenberg, and Brad Thompson for comments on earlier drafts.
